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1ASHINGTON CASE LAW-1957
chased the homestead would have it free of encumbrances, other than mortgages. The
court said this impliedly exempted the proceeds of the sale from garnishment for a
reasonable time after sale.
Applying this rationale to the Lien case, the court reasoned that if the homestead
were to be encumbered by a judgment lien after it had been sold to a purchaser for
value, it would be virtually impossible for one who declares a homestead to sell his
land. RCW 6.12.090 gives the holder of a homestead the right to: (1) sell the home-
stead; (2) hold the proceeds free from execution for a year after the sale; (3) pur-
chase a new homestead which is free from execution. The court reasoned that these
three rights would be "hollow and, for practical purposes, meaningless," unless there
is a concurrent right in one who declares a homestead to "convey the homestead to a
bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration free of a judgment against the former
owner of the homestead."
SALES
Recovery on Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness-Necessity
of Contractual Privity. In Martin v. J. C. Penney Co.' the plaintiff,
an infant, was allowed recovery for the breach of an implied war-
ranty of fitness on a cotton shirt that had been purchased as a birthday
gift for him by his mother. The scope of this note is limited to the
treatment of the requisite of contractual privity between the plaintiff
and the warrantor-defendant.
It was stipulated by the parties2 that the plaintiff's claim should be
predicated solely upon an implied warranty of fitness under the
Washington Uniform Sales Act.' This statutory provision establishes
that when the buyer makes known to the seller, either expressly or
by implication, the purpose for which the article is to be used, and
the buyer relies upon the seller's skill and judgment as to fitness, there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose. The court correctly found that these requisites were satis-
fied by virtue of the mother's notification to the seller that the shirt
purchased was to be a birthday present for her fourteen-year-old son,
and by the fact that she had no personal knowledge as to the quality
of the material of the garment, especially its inflammable propensities.4
In addition to these elements of knowledge of purpose and reliance,
Washington has adopted the general rule that if there is to be a recov-
ery on an implied warranty based upon this statutory provision the
1 50 Wn.2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957); petition for rehearing denied, 151 Wash.
Dec. 182 (1957).
- Martin v. J. C. Penney Co., docket No. 482272, Superior Court for King County,
Washington.
3 RCW 63.04.160.
4 See Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wn2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952), for a nearly
identical fact situation in this respect.
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parties to the action must be in contractual privity with each other.'
To this general rule are appended several exceptions, the two most
common of which negate the necessity of establishing privity in sales
warranty cases involving unwholesome food eventually consumed by
the plaintiff,6 or an article that "is of a noxious and dangerous kind."'
It is also recognized that the privity requirement in implied warranty
actions can be supplied by the existence of either an agency relation-
ship between the initial purchaser and the ultimate plaintiff,' or by
the plaintiff being a third party beneficiary to the original sale.9
Was there privity between the plaintiff and the defendant in the
Martin case, or were the facts such that privity was not required? The
problem was at least recognized at the trial level, the plaintiff includ-
ing in his trial brief the statement that "No serious argument on privity
is expected.... " He was right, and perhaps unfortunately, for had
there been a ruling on that issue, Washington law would have been
substantially clarified in reference to sale warranty cases. However,
the privity question was not raised by either party on the appeal, and
the court's decision did not mention it.
To enlighten the problem as to what would have happened in the
Martin case had the issue of privity been raised by the defense, con-
sideration will be made of all the possible methods of satisfying this
requirement. Initially the possibility that the requirement for privity
may have been eliminated under the "article for internal consump-
tion" exception should be disposed of, for clothing is clearly not
within that definition. It is also evident that privity could not be sup-
plied on any theory of an agency relationship, for the purchase was
to be a gift to the plaintiff, who had no knowledge of the transaction
and no control over either the purchaser or the defendant-seller."1
5 Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn.2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945) ; Mazetti v. Armour &
Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913) (dictum); Fleenor v. Erickson, 35 Wn.2d 891,
215 P.2d 885 (1950) ; Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wn.2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955) (dic-
tum) ; see Privity; Property Damages; and Personal Injuries... A Re-Appraisal, 32
WASH. L. REv. 153 (1957).6 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., note 5, supra; Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 16
Vn.2d 1, 132 P.2d 76 (1942) ; Baum v. Murray, 23 Wn.2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945);
McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Calif., 1954) (dog food).
7 Fleenor v. Erickson, note 5, supra, at 898; Mazetti v. Armour & Co., note 5, supra.
s Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wn.2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955) (it appears that the
existence of the agency relationship was a fiction; see Privity; Property Damages;
and Personal Injuries... A Re-Appraisal, 32 WASH. L. REv. 152 (1957).) Wisdom v.
Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050 (1928).
9 Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wn.2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952).
10 Note 2, supra.
11 A manifestation of consent to act as an agent must be derived from the principal.
RESTATEMENT, AGENcY §§ (1(1), 26(a) (1933). Here the plaintiff did nothing from
which consent to establish an agency relationship could be implied.
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What the Washington court meant when it said in Mazzetti v.
Armour & Co." that one of the recognized exceptions to the privity
requirement was "(w)here the thing causing the injury is of a noxious
or dangerous dnd," has never been made clear. To exemplify this
exception the court in the Mazzetti case cited three cases" which they
claimed supported their proposition. In two of these cases the article
causing the injury was a medicine to be taken internally. 4 It would
seem that these cases would easily fall within the "article for con-
sumption" exception, and therefore are, at the most, weak authorities
for the "noxious and dangerous" proposition. As to the other Wash-
ington case cited in support of the "noxious or dangerous article"
exception,"5 the article causing the injury was a bottle of explosive
"champagne cider," which was sold by the defendant to the plain-
tiff's employer. In the action to recover for injuries sustained from
the bottle's explosion, the court overruled the defendant's demurrer
to the complaint. But the complaint was not predicated upon any
warranties of the seller as to the safety of the article; it was based
entirely upon the defendant's negligence "for want of ordinary care
in manufacturing, bottling, preparing and selling of said champagne."' 6
This case is therefore no authority for actions under the warranties
of the Sales Act, for it is inherent in the very definition of a "warranty
of fitness" that recovery is not based upon the tortious conduct of the
seller, but simply upon his failure to supply goods which are fit for
their intended purposeY
All subsequent Washington cases, other than those involving food,
which have given lip service to the Mazetti "noxious and dangerous"
exception to the privity requirement, have been actions predicated on
1 75 Wash. 622, 625, 135 Pac. 633, 635 (1913).
"3 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852) ; Blood Balm Co. v.
Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S.E. 118, 20 Am. St. 324, 5 L.R.A. 612 (1889); Weiser v.
Holzman, 33 Wash. 87, 73 Pac. 797, 99 Am. St. 932 (1903).
14 Thomas v. Winchester, note 13, supra; Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, note 13, supra.
15 Weiser v. Holzman, note 13, supra.
16 33 Wash. 87, at 89.
17 "The Seller's obligation is not based on negligence." 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 237
(rev. ed. 1948). Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421
(1953), held that in an action based on implied warranty of fitness, negligence was not
an element and that the tort statute of limitations was not applicable. The facts of the
case are similar to those in Martin v. J. C. Penney; the suit being to recover damages
for pain and suffering sustained by infant son who was burned to death when cowboy
suit his mother purchased for him ignited. The plaintiff's appellate brief submits that
privity is not required where the goods are "inherently dangerous" and gives in support
the Washington cases cited in note 9, supra. The court's decision makes no mention of
the issue.
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negligence, in which there was a foreseeable risk of injury to others
than the buyer." Therefore it is not clear that there is a "noxious and
dangerous" exception to the privity requirement in recoveries based
on implied warranties of fitness. But if the court should recognize
this "dictum without authority" from the Mazetti case, it would seem
that because of the substantial danger of grave injury that is inherent
in a highly inflammable shirt such as that sold by the J. C. Penney
Co., such an article should be within that exception and the seller
should be liable for resultant injuries to whomever wears that shirt.
In Jeffrey v. Hanson" it was held that a third party beneficiary of
a sales contract was in such privity with the seller as to be able to
maintain an action for breach of an express warranty against him.
Because the seller knew that the article was for resale to the plaintiff,
and the parties to the sale intended the same, the warranty obligation
inured to the plaintiff as a beneficiary of the contract.
Could the infant plaintiff in the Martin case qualify as a third party
beneficiary to the sale of the shirt by the defendant store to his mother?
"Where performance of a contractual promise will benefit another
than the promisee, the beneficiary is a donee beneficiary, if the promisee
intends to make a gift to such beneficiary or grant him rights against
the promisor to performance neither due nor asserted to be due from
the promisee."'"
At the time the shirt was sold to the plaintiff's mother it was
expressly understood between the parties that it was to be a gift to
the buyer's fourteen-year-old son; the evident intent of the buyer
was to bestow a gift to the plaintiff, and it was so understood by the
defendant store. With full realization that the performance was to
Is Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd 15 P.2d 1118 (1932)
(car windshield shattered; action apparently in tort) ; Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc.,
18 Wn.2d 458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943) (faulty repair of truck).
19 In Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn.2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945) (sale of defective
antifreeze resulting in injury to plaintiff's automobile; recovery against wholesaler on
breach of warranty denied for lack of privity), our court gave what may be a clue to
their inclination in these cases. They distinguished the Baxter and Bock cases, note
18, supra, on the ground that in those cases there was severe injury to the person, not
damages to his property as caused by the antifreeze. "There is no question of public
policy involved in this case." The court felt that they were not compelled to allow
recovery in face of the lack of privity. See also Carson v. Weston Hotel Corp., 342
Ill. App. 602, 97 N.E2d 620 (1951) (seller of wire rope should know that any defect
in product may result in injury to many others; held to warrant the product to third
persons so injured).
20 39 Wr2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952).
2
1 Ridder v. Blethen, 24 Wn.2d 552, 166 P.2d 834 (1946) ; Sayward v. Dexter Hor-
ton & Co., 72 Fed. 758, 19 C.C.A. 176 (1896) ; Burton -. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246, 13 Pac.
398 (1887).
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be the plaintiff, under the theory of the Jeffery case there is no reason
for finding that any warranties of that performance should not also
go to the plaintiff. The factual situations are essentially the same in
each case. The fact that in the Jeffery case the warranty was express,
while in the Martin case it was implied by law, would seem immaterial
in light of the application of the exception to the privity requirement
in cases of food sales, regardless of whether the warranty was express
or implied.2
Adopting the third party beneficiary reasoning, the warranty obli-
gation of the defendant-seller accrued to the infant plaintiff in the
Martin case by virtue of the intent of the parties of the original sale
to bestow that obligation upon him as a third party beneficiary of
the sale.
The Washington court, in Freeman v. Navarre," expressed its
opinion that "it appears that a realistic, judicial analysis and reap-
praisal of the privity rule would be quite appropriate." Although the
court could have allowed recovery in the Martin case on the theory of
either a "noxious and dangerous" article, or a "third party beneficiary,"
it seems that a conspicuous opportunity to clarify the application of
these exceptions to the privity requirement in warranty on sales cases
was unfortunately missed.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code24 the problem presented in the
Martin case would be substantially clarified, as Art. II, §318, entitled,
"Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied," pro-
vides that such warranties shall extend to anyone who is in the family
or household of the buyer or a guest in his home, if it could be
expected that such person would use, consume, or be affected by the
goods sold. The comments to this section reflect the codifiers' pre-
dispositions to abolish the privity requirement when the injury is to
one closely associated with the actual buyer.2"
The Washington decisions have displayed a similar predisposition,26
but have failed to express how extensive this negation of the privity
requirement shall be. In the food cases the court has recognized
2 2 Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wn.2d 760, 289 P2d 1015 (1955) (it appears that the
existence of the agency relationship was a fiction; see Privity; Property Damages; and
Personal Injuries... A Re-Appraisal, 32 WAsH. L. RFv. 152 (1957). Wisdom v.
Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050 (1928).
23 47 Wn.2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955).
24 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
25 Ibid., comment 3.
26 See in particular Freeman v. Navarre, note 8, supra, reviewing cases.
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strong policy arguments and said that there shall be no privity
requirement. As to a noxious and dangerous article they said the
same, but have yet to have such a case. Beyond this the court has
negated the effect of the privity requirement only by resort to other
legal concepts, such as the third party beneficiary and the agency
relationship. Unfortunately these concepts are awkward to apply,
often requiring fictions or at least extention of the concepts into a
new area. While this may be expedient in particular cases, eventu-
ally the application of these "borrowed" concepts may prove unwork-
able, especially where the equities of the case demand denial of
recovery.
The U.C.C.'s provision is a practical and realistic extention of the
warranty obligation, based upon strong policy arguments; such an
approach requires no torturing of existing legal principles, and pro-
vides a high degree of predictability. There is no obstacle to the
court making this equitable exception to the privity requirement"-
when the injury is inflicted on someone in the buyer's household. Cases
such as Martin v. J. C. Penney could be brought directly within such
an exception, without resort to other legal concepts.
JAMES M. HLTON
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Mortgages-Obligation Requirement. In Koster v. Wingard, 50 Wn.2d 855, 314
P.2d 928 (1957), the court refused to accept the plaintiff's contention that an equitable
mortgage was created by the acts of the parties. During the course of the opinion the
court stated that "... a mortgage can not exist without a debt, and that debt must be
identified and the amount fixed with certainty." Since the court needed only to decide
whether the alleged equitable mortgage was actually supported by an obligation, the
court's language was broader than required by the issue before it. The Washington
court has previously used the language "a mortgage cannot exist without a debt" in
other situations where the case did not require the statement of so broad a rule. Hays
v. Bashor, 108 Wash. 491, 185 Pac. 814 (1919) ; Tesdahl v. Collins, 2 Wn.2d 76, 97
P.2d 649 (1939) ; O'Reilly v. Tillman, 111 Wash. 594, 191 Pac. 866 (1920).
The court in Koster v. Wingard, supra, may have meant to state a general require-
ment for both equitable and legal mortgages that if the obligation for which the
mortgage is given fails for some reason, the mortgage is not enforceable. WALSH,
MORTGAGES 74 (1934); OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 74 (1951); Osborne § 103 (1951); 3
GLENN, MORTGAGES § 396-97 (1943). In stating the requirement as broadly as it did,
the court would apparently invaliadet gift mortgages, mortgages given for advances to
be made in the future, and those mortgages which secure unliquidated debts. There is a
considerable amount of authority to support the proposition that money need not be
27 See Prizity; Property Damages; and Personal Injuries... A Re-Appraisal. note
8, supra.
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